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INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY France

25X1

DATE DISTR. 17 December 1947

SUBJECT Communist Plans for the Attack on France

NO. OF PAGES 2

25X1

NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

25X1

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1. Orders for a Communist attack upon France have been issued by Moscow and are presently being implemented. The original plan of attack, however, was modified to conform with last minute political developments in France.

Original Plan of Attack

2. The Communist forces originally were deployed as follows:
 - (a) There were two main forces around Paris,
 - (1) one of Trotskyist allegiance, stationed in the North, in the Stains-St Denis-Le Bourget area, was earmarked for an assault on Paris in the pattern of 1871.
 - (2) The other, stationed in the South Zone, was to follow up after a few days, absorb the Trotskyists, and stop their action. By doing this, they could pose as the saviours of the Republic and legality and seize power.
 - (b) Below the Ile d'Oleron-Geneva line, in the Provinces, forces were deployed under pretext of helping the Spanish Republicans against Franco. In this region a series of Soviet governments were to be proclaimed with Toulouse as the capital of the area.
 - (c) The foregoing preparations were to prepare the way for incoming Soviet troops.

Change in the Political Situation

3. Possibility of success, in a series of maneuvers like those suggested above, diminished because of the following:
 - (a) Progressive disaffection of the masses with the Communist Party and the Communist elements in CGT.

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- (b) Establishment of autonomous trade unions whose presence disrupted the Communist unity which formerly prevailed in CGT ranks.
- (c) Redeployment of para-military Communist groups as a result of Communist ministers being dropped from the Cabinet.
- (d) The need to furnish cadres, from the para-military groups, for service in the Balkans.
- (e) The Hamadier Government's order to Gen Revers to organize for counter action.

Regrouping of Communists

4. After this the Communist forces were regrouped according to the following plan:

- (a) Paris was to be cut off from the border regions, especially in the Northeast (Belgium), the North (La Manche) and the Atlantic coast from Brest to Biarritz.
 - (1) In these areas redeployment was achieved by use of para-military groups and "light elements"—chains of cells extending from Brest to the Midi. Activation of these cells was through resistance centers in Quimper, St Nazaire, Limoges, the Lot, the Dordogne and the Landes.
 - (2) In the Midi the system was the strongest. Key points were Toulouse, Narbonne, Perpignan, Nîmes and Montpellier. The Communists had planned to start insurrectional maneuvers here and to proclaim local Soviets.
- (b) Entranceways from Italy were to be kept open, so that in the event of a victorious insurrection there, Italian Communists could establish contact with the centers in the Midi. This was the cause of events that took place in Marseilles.

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